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Giving to Government: Voluntary Taxation in the Lab* 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
In the United States, there is widespread antipathy toward taxation, yet at the same time there are substantial 
voluntary donations to nonprofit organizations with missions that are parallel to those of many government 
agencies.  In this paper we compare giving in the form of voluntary taxes paid to government agencies with 
giving in the form of voluntary donations to nonprofit organizations that have similar missions.  In a 
laboratory experimental setting, subjects are given an endowment, and are given the opportunity to donate 
any part of the endowment to a government agency or to a nonprofit organization.  We compare levels of 
giving to private and government organizations for four different causes (cancer research, disaster relief, 
education, and parks and wildlife) at three levels of government (federal, state and local).  Within a session, 
subjects make 12 decisions: they complete all six separate decisions for each of two causes, selected 
randomly from the four listed above.  We find that people are not averse to giving to government.  On 
average, they give 22 percent of their budget to government when anonymity is ensured and giving is 
completely voluntary.   However, they do show a preference for nonprofit charities by giving higher amounts 
for most causes and levels of government. The willingness to give is influenced by the cause and level of the 
organization, as well as perceptions of the organization.  
 
JEL codes: H2, D64, C91 
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Giving to Government: Voluntary Taxation in the Lab 
 
 
I. Introduction 
Giving USA 2007 reports that for 2006, giving to nonprofit organizations totaled $295 billion, 2.2 
percent of Gross Domestic Product.  The largest share (33 percent) of this giving went to religious 
congregations.  The categories of education, health, and human services each received about 10 percent of 
the total.  Approximately 75 percent of the total came from individual donors.  In the same year, the 
combined federal, state, and local governments had current expenditures of $4,130 billion, approximately 31 
percent of Gross Domestic Product (Economic report of the President 2008).  Many of the government 
agencies funded by these outlays have missions that mirror or overlap with the missions of many nonprofit 
organizations. While government agencies and nonprofit organizations often serve the same constituent 
bases with the same end goals, the means by which their respective activities are financed are perceived very 
differently.  Paying taxes is vilified by individuals who, at the same time, freely contribute to nonprofit 
causes. 
What underlies this antipathy?  Three possible explanations come to mind.  First, distaste for 
government and taxes may reflect a belief that a government organization is inferior to its private 
counterpart, either because it is relatively inefficient, or because private managers are better able to 
accomplish specific goals as compared to government managers; i.e., the nonprofit agency can better achieve 
the desired goal more effectively or at lower cost than can its government counterpart.
1
  Second, such 
distaste may reflect the coercive nature of taxes versus the voluntary nature of contributions.  That is, an 
individual may perceive a government agency as equal to, or better than, the nonprofit counterpart, but reject 
being forced to pay.  Third, difference in attitudes towards taxes and charitable giving may reflect 
                                                 
1
 Numerous studies have found private sector operations to be more cost-effective and more efficient than public sector operations 
(see Mueller, 1989, for a review of the literature). 
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individuals’ desire to control the use of their funds.2  In the case of charitable contributions, people can make 
their own decisions on the social programs or causes to send support, whereas for taxes, taxpayers seldom 
get chances to earmark their tax payments for government agencies that serve the causes they desire.   
In this study we use laboratory experiments to control for the latter two while examining the first 
explanation.  In our experiments, giving is voluntary, so coercion is absent, and subjects can donate funds 
earmarked for specific functions, avoiding the problem that government revenue is used to support a number 
of causes.  We employ a ―real donation‖ experiment, first used in Eckel and Grossman (1996), where 
subjects are given an endowment and the opportunity to donate any part of that endowment to a specific 
organization: donated funds are forwarded to the organization in question.  An array of organizations is used, 
consisting of pairs of private charities and government agencies matched by their primary function.  This 
makes the decisions to donate as comparable as possible, the only difference being that one organization is 
privately organized, and the other government-managed.  In addition, we collect survey information to gauge 
perceptions of the efficacy and efficiency of the organization.  This allows us to compare directly a subject’s 
giving in the form of voluntary taxes paid to a government agency with giving in the form of voluntary 
donations to a nonprofit organization with a similar mission.   
A related question is whether or not distaste for taxation differs by level of government.  Assuming 
that the median voter rule applies and that diversity of tastes and preferences increases with population size, 
voter dissatisfaction with government will be greater at the national level than at the local level. Smaller, 
local government units may better reflect the taste and preferences of their constituents.  As such, preference 
for nonprofits relative to government would be greater at the national than the local level.  Our study covers 
three levels of organizations: local, state and national.   
We draw on previous experimental research to focus on voluntary donations to government 
organizations, and their relation to private charitable giving.  Experimental research has made important 
                                                 
2
 In 2000, the state of Pennsylvania mailed out 2.5 million income tax rebates to its taxpayers. Hundreds of taxpayers, some who 
lived in the poorest city neighborhoods, signed over their checks to local school districts. One donor was quoted as saying that 
―That’s exactly the point in giving people their own money – to do with it what they want‖ (New York Times 2000). 
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contributions to the study of taxation and charitable giving, using both lab and field methods.  Taxation 
experiments have focused on tax compliance, which, given the relatively low probabilities of audit, is closely 
related to voluntary taxation (Alm, McClelland and Schulze, 1992; Alm and McKee, 2004; Andreoni, Erard 
and Feinstein, 1998).  On the subject of charitable giving, many recent experimental studies address motives 
for giving and the factors affecting donations (Andreoni, 2006, 2008 surveys much of this research; 
examples of specific experiments include Eckel and Grossman, 2003; Eckel, Grossman and Johnston, 2005; 
Karlan and List, 2007, and others too numerous to cite.)  List (2008) argues the appropriateness and utility of 
lab and field experiments as complementary methods; the present study is a lab experiment, but involving 
real charitable donations, giving it some of the flavor of a field study.   
We find that people are not averse to giving to government.  On average, they give 22 percent of their 
budget to government when anonymity is ensured and giving is completely voluntary, although they do show 
preferences for nonprofit charities by giving a slightly higher share, 27 percent, of their budget. The 
willingness to give varies systematically by the function and level of the organization, as well as perceptions 
of the organization.  
Our findings suggest that the antipathy often expressed towards government may be more antipathy 
to coercion or lack of control over the use of resources, rather than to government per se, and that taxpayers 
do embrace the voluntary and earmarked feature of a gift to government.  This pattern of behavior is 
consistent with the increasing amount of contributions to ―check-off‖ programs – i.e., taxpayers can ―check 
off‖ contributions to federal and state programs on their income tax returns – as well as other voluntary 
reporting and taxation measures.  We revisit these programs in the conclusion with an eye to policy 
implications. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the experimental design.  Section III 
presents the analysis and results. Section IV concludes. 
 
II. The Experiment 
Design 
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The design of the study incorporates an experiment and a post-experiment survey.  The experiment 
consists of a series of distinct budget allocation decisions, where subjects choose how much (if any) of an 
endowment to donate to government or private organization. The survey is completed after the experiment 
and collects information on standard demographics, religion, major, political affiliation, other charitable 
giving behavior, and perceived duties of governmental organizations and non-governmental charities.   
For each allocation decision, subjects are provided an endowment of $20.00.  They are given the 
opportunity to donate (in private and anonymously) any part of the endowment to the organization they are 
paired with in each allocation decision.
3
  Each decision involves a real trade-off between a subject’s own 
earnings in the experiment and the amount sent to the organizations.  Hence these measures are likely to be 
more accurate and informative than survey based measures of altruistic behavior (see Eckel and Grossman 
2003, 2006, 2007).   
The characteristics of the organizations vary systematically in order to study preferences for 
charitable giving.  The design consists of three factors:  1) government vs. private organization; 2) level of 
the organization (national, state, and local), and 3) the function of the organization (cancer, education, parks 
and wildlife, disaster relief) for a total of 2x3x4 = 24 treatments.  An important – and challenging – part of 
the design was to identify organizations that were parallel in their scope of activities, and where the 
government organization could receive donations.
4
  Appendix A lists and describes the organizations used in 
the experiment.  This information was available to the subjects in the instructions and decision forms.  In 
addition, everyone had a separate sheet of more detailed descriptions on the organizations for their reference.  
In each session, a subject makes six decisions – a full set of government and private organizations at each 
level – for each of two randomly-paired functions.  Four different pairings of the four categories were tested: 
                                                 
3
 An alternative design is to give subjects a list of public and private organizations, and let them choose organizations and decide 
how much to contribute. The drawback of this design is that researchers cannot observe the contributions for those organizations 
that subjects do not select.  
4
 Despite our enormous effort in identifying the government agencies, we received inconsistent information on whether private gift 
would be allowed by the Dallas City Office of Emergency Management. The check was returned to us.  
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Parks and Wildlife/ Education Enhancement, Parks and Wildlife/Disaster Relief, Cancer Research and 
Prevention/Education Enhancement, Cancer Research and Prevention/Disaster Relief. 
At the end of the experiment one decision was chosen randomly for payment, and the money 
allocated as indicated by the subject.  The subjects received the part of the endowment they allocated to 
themselves, and the specific organization was mailed its allocated part of the endowment as described below. 
Procedures 
A total of 11 sessions were conducted at the University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) with 125 subjects 
participating.  We intended to use only undergraduate students as subjects; however, a few mostly 
international graduate students (21) were inadvertently recruited.  We dropped all graduate student 
observations to prevent biasing the results, since international graduate students were unlikely to have the 
same preferences as the undergraduates, who are overwhelmingly U.S. residents.
5
  We ended up with a total 
of 104 undergraduate students, 11 of which served as monitors for their sessions. 
Subjects were recruited for the hour-long experiment by email using a database of undergraduate 
students who previously indicated interest in participating in experiments.  The sessions were run at the 
Center for Behavioral and Experimental Economic Science (CBEES) of the University of Texas at Dallas.  
Subjects arrived at the lab and signed a consent form while seated in the lab’s reception area.  Before 
starting, the experimenters asked for a volunteer to be a monitor.  It was announced the monitor would be 
paid a flat amount of $20, and that the monitor would help the experimenters when needed, make sure that 
instructions were properly followed, and mostly importantly, accompany the experimenters to mail the 
checks to the organizations after the experiment was over.   
All subjects were then escorted into the lab, which contains partitioned desks.  On each desk were a 
set of instructions, an index card with a randomly assigned ID number, a packet of allocation decision forms, 
and an envelope to hold the allocation decision forms (see Appendix B for a sample copy of the instructions 
and allocation forms).   Experiment ID numbers were used to preserve anonymity.  The instructions which 
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 We did not collection information in the survey on whether they were U.S. citizens or residents. So we were not able to identify 
international undergraduate students in our sample. We dropped only graduate students from our sample since they are 
overwhelmingly international students.    
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covered all aspects of the procedure, were read aloud and included examples.  The instructions also included 
a detailed description of the monitor’s duties.  Subjects were given the opportunity to ask questions.  Upon 
finishing their allocation decisions, subjects sealed the forms in the envelopes provided.  An experimenter 
then brought each subject a 6-sided die which was rolled twice.  The first roll determined the function (an 
odd roll meant the first function in their packet was selected, an even roll meant the second) and the second 
roll determined which of the six decisions of the selected category would be used for payment (the decisions 
were numbered in each category 1-6).  Having each subject separately and randomly determining his paired 
organization ensured independent decisions.  After subjects finished with their allocation decisions, they 
were asked to sign a payment receipt form stating that they received $20 and had the opportunity to allocate 
some of it to a charity.  Forms were then collected, and the survey distributed. 
While subjects were filling out the surveys, an experimenter and the monitor went to a separate room.  
They prepared a payment envelope for each subject, containing the subject’s earnings (how much he had 
allocated to himself) and a slip reminding the subject of his paired organization.  Envelopes were only 
marked with an ID number on the front.  Subjects used their ID cards to claim payment from the monitor.  
This structure ensured complete anonymity of decisions. 
After the subjects were paid, the monitor assisted the experimenter in writing checks to the 
organizations.  The monitor verified and sealed each stamped, pre-addressed envelope and then walked with 
the experimenter to drop the checks in the mailbox.  Subjects also were invited to stay behind and 
accompany the experimenter and the monitor to the mailbox, though none did. 
 
III.  Results 
Among 93 participants, 17 always gave the same amount regardless of the types, causes, and levels of 
the organization. Thirteen participants always gave zero, whereas two always gave all $20.  Average giving 
is shown in Figure 1 and in Table 1 below.  Donations are highest for Disaster Relief and Cancer, and 
somewhat lower for Parks and Wildlife and Education. To our surprise, in all cases average giving is non-
  8 
trivial for both government and private organizations.  For government organizations, the average 
contribution varies from $1.78 (local-level Parks and Wildlife) to $6.51 (local-level Cancer). For nonprofit 
charities, it varies from $2.53 (local-level Parks and Wildlife) to $8.76 (national-level Disaster Relief). In 
many cases giving is very similar across matched private and government organizations. This leads to first 
two results. 
[Table 1 about here] 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Result 1:  People will give to government organizations, paying voluntary taxes for specific functions.   
Support:  Table 1 and Figure 1 show that average donations to government organizations are significantly 
different from zero for all levels and all causes (t test of means, p < 0.01).  By pooling data from all levels, 
we find that the average contributions to government organizations are $5.89, $3.67, $3.48, and $4.59 for 
Cancer, Education, Parks and Wildlife, and Disaster Relief, respectively.   
Result 2:  Contributions to charity and to government organizations are positively and significantly 
correlated for all causes and all levels.   
Support:  Table 1 shows that average giving to paired private charities and government organizations are 
highly correlated across all levels and categories.  The correlation varies from 0.52 to 0.81 and all are 
statistically significant (p < 0.01).  
Table 1 contains results of t test for mean giving for all decisions, for participants who chose to give a 
positive amount to at least one organization (i.e., those participants who always gave zero regardless of the 
organizations are excluded), and for positive donations only (i.e., those decisions in which participants gave 
zero are excluded).  Excluding zero donors has little effect on levels or significance of the results.  We find 
that, in general, giving is contingent on the types, causes, and levels of organizations.  In particular, average 
giving is significantly higher for private than government organizations for Cancer and Disaster Relief at all 
levels (p < 0.10) except for Cancer at the local level (p > 0.10).  Parks and Wildlife organizations receive 
similar amounts of giving at all levels (p > 0.10).  Giving to Education depends on the levels of the 
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organizations. Specifically, average giving is similar for private and government organizations at the national 
level, is significantly higher for the government organization at the state level (p < 0.05), and is significantly 
higher for private organization at the local level (p < 0.10).   
We also conduct Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank tests to compare the distributions of giving to 
government and private organizations.  Table 2 presents the results which are generally consistent with the 
results for the means test in Table 1.
6
  This gives us our third result. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
Result 3: Giving to private organizations is typically greater than or equal to giving to government 
organizations. 
On average, participants chose to keep all $20 and give zero to the organizations in 36.3 percent of 
their decisions. The probability of a positive contribution exhibits wide heterogeneity across causes, types, 
and levels of organizations. We conduct McNemar’s test for binomial proportions for matched samples. The 
probability of giving a positive amount and the results of McNemar’s test are reported in Table 3. We find 
that the probability of giving is generally higher for the private than for government organizations with 
significant difference for Cancer at all levels, Parks and Wildlife at the local level, and Disaster Relief at the 
national and local levels. The only exception is for Education at the state level where 58 percent of 
participants made contributions to the government organization compared to 48 percent to charity. The 
difference, however, is not statistically significant (p = 0.275).  Overall, we find that the probability of giving 
is significantly higher for charities than for government organizations for Cancer and Disaster Relief (p < 
0.01), but insignificantly different for Education (p = 0.721) and Parks and Wildlife (p = 0.418). In addition, 
the probability of giving is contingent on the causes. It is significantly higher for Cancer (83 percent for 
private and 68.8 percent for government organization) and Disaster Relief (79.8 percent and 66.7 percent) 
                                                 
6
 Some exceptions include state level Cancer (means test shows average giving to the government is significantly higher than to 
charity (t = 1.69) whereas the signed-rank test shows the two distributions are not different from each other (p = 0.221)), local 
level Cancer (average giving is similar to the private and government organizations (t = 1.13), whereas the signed-rank test shows 
giving to charity is significantly higher (p = 0.011)), and state level Education (average giving is significantly higher for the 
government (t = 2.04) whereas the signed-rank test shows no difference between the two distributions (p = 0.170)).  
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than for Education (54.7 percent and 54 percent) and Parks and Wildlife (55.1 percent and 50 percent). These 
finds suggest our fourth  and fifth result. 
 
 [Table 3 about here] 
Result 4: Subjects are more likely to make a positive contribution to private than to government 
organizations. 
Result 5: Compared to Education and Parks and Wildlife, the likelihood of giving is significantly higher for 
Cancer and Disaster Relief.   
Table 1 also shows average donations conditional on giving.  In only one case (Disaster Relief at the 
national level) is the average conditional donation to government ($7.45) significantly different from the 
average conditional donation to the private organization ($10.18) (p < 0.10).  It appears that the primary 
decision by donors is whether to give, with several focal levels of giving leading to very similar sized 
average gifts.
7
  Overall, average donations to charities conditional on giving are higher for Cancer ($8.84) 
and Disaster Relief ($8.53) than for Education ($6.54) and Parks and Wildlife ($6.66).  Average donations to 
government organizations conditional on giving are higher for Cancer ($8.56) than the other three causes 
($6.80 for Education, $6.95 for Parks and Wildlife, and $6.89 for Disaster Relief).   
Result 6: Conditional on giving, average gift size is similar between matched government and private 
organizations.  
[Table 4 about here] 
 
In the survey after the experiment, we solicited participants’ perceptions of the government 
organizations and charities used in that session.  We first asked whether they think supporting the service is 
an important cause.  We then asked participants how much they trust each organization and their perceptions 
of the responsibility, resources currently spent, quality of work, additional resources needed, and efficiency 
                                                 
7
 Most common focal points of gifts are $0 (36.3 percent), $5 (16.2 percent), $10 (12.2 percent), $2 (6.1 percent), $15 (4 percent), 
$3 (3.9 percent), and $20 (3.7 percent).   
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for each.     Participants were told to use their best guess if they had no prior experience or were unfamiliar 
with the organization. A set of sample questions for Cancer are included in Appendix C.  Summary statistics 
on participants’ responses are presented in Appendix D.  
Results of t-tests for paired samples on the comparison of perceptions of government agencies and 
charities are reported in Table 4. Combining Appendix D with Table 4, we find that trust is uniformly higher 
toward private than toward government organizations (p < 0.05 except for Education and Parks and Wildlife 
on the local level).  This pattern also holds for quality of the work (p < 0.05 except for education on the state 
and local levels, and parks and wildlife on all levels), and efficiency of the organizations (p < 0.05 except for 
parks and wildlife on the national level).
8
  Government organizations are seen as having greater 
responsibility for all functions (p < 0.05 except for Cancer Research and Prevention on the local level), with 
national-level government most responsible for Cancer, and state-level government for Education and Parks 
and Wildlife.  Government is seen as having spent slightly more resources than charity at all levels for 
Education (p > 0.05). The direction of comparison is reversed for all other causes. In particular, subjects 
perceive that charity has spent significantly more resources than government in cancer research and 
prevention (p < 0.05).  Private charities are seen as having greater need for resources than their governmental 
counterparts with significant difference for national- and local-level Cancer, as well as national- and state-
level Disaster Relief (p < 0.05).  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
 
To systematically investigate the effects on giving of the treatments and participants’ perception, we 
use a random-effects Tobit model, with the amount contributed to each organization as the dependent 
variable. The data are censored since, by design, donations are limited to lie between zero and $20: 36.3 
percent of observations are at zero and 3.7 percent at $20.  Regression results are presented in Table 5. As 
the benchmark, the first model in column 2 contains the treatment variables, including the types of 
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 The only exception is for quality of Parks and Wildlife at the state level where the perception of quality of the state government 
organization is 3.26, slightly higher than 3.13 for the state charity.  
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organization (Charity versus Government), causes (Cancer, Education, Parks and Wildlife (P&W), and 
Disaster Relief) and levels (National, Texas, and Dallas), as well as the pairings of causes used in each 
session. Recall that participants made decisions for a series of organizations for two randomly paired 
functions. Because of the potential effects of the specific pairings of functions on individuals’ contributions,  
we control for pairings within a session (Cancer-Disaster, Cancer-Education, P&W-Disaster, and P&W-
Education). The omitted variables are Government, Cancer, National, and P&W-Education. Column 3 adds 
three variables to capture key features of perceptions:  whether the organization serves an important cause, 
whether it is the organization’s responsibility to provide the service specified, and whether it is a good 
organization. The variables Important Cause and Responsibility are constructed directly from survey 
responses to questions 1 and 3 (see Appendix C). Good Organization is constructed using factor analysis 
with varimax rotation based on the survey questions on trust, resources currently spent, quality of work, and 
efficiency of the organization. Column 4 further includes demographic variables such as gender, race, and 
age. Column 5 excludes the main effect for Charity but replaces it with interactions with each of the four 
causes to allow for differential effects across causes.    
The results in Table 5 are robust across the specifications and consistent with earlier analysis. We 
find that the amount given to charities is significantly greater than given to government agencies (p < 0.01). 
People give more to Cancer than to the three other causes (p < 0.01).  The national organizations/agencies 
attract more contributions than the state or local ones (p < 0.01). The Cancer-Disaster pairing is associated 
with a higher level of giving than any other pairing (p < 0.05 in columns 1 and 2). The Charity and Disaster 
Relief interaction suggests, other things being equal, the amount given to disaster relief is significantly 
higher for private charities than for government agencies (p < 0.01), no doubt reflecting recent perceptions of 
FEMA’s handling of Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath (Eckel, Grossman and Milano, 2007). The amount 
given to Cancer is marginally higher for charities than for government agencies (p < 0.10). These findings 
confirm the patterns in Figure 1.  
  13 
People’s perceptions play important roles in individuals’ decisions about giving. The more important 
the cause is perceived to be, the higher the contribution (p < 0.05). A ―good‖ organization, which is trusted 
and efficient, had high levels of spending (resources), and provides high quality of work, enjoys greater 
contributions (p < 0.01).  People give more if they perceive it is the organization’s responsibility to provide 
the specified service (p < 0.05 in column 2 and p < 0.10 in column 3), but the effect is smaller in column 4 
which includes the Charity and cause interactions.  
Among the subject characteristic variables, we find that women contribute more than men (p < 0.01), 
consistent with previous studies (Eckel and Grossman, 1998 and 2008). Neither race nor age is related to the 
level of giving.  
[Table 6 about here] 
To closely examine the potential heterogeneous effects on giving of the causes and levels of 
organizations and individual perceptions, we disaggregate the data by type of organization and reapply the 
random effect tobit models. Table 6 reports the results with column 1-3 for private charities and column 4-6 
for governmental organizations. The results, although largely confirming those in Table 5, reveal two 
interesting heterogeneous effects. First, the difference in the amount of giving to the national versus state 
levels exists uniquely for private charities (p < 0.01 in columns 1-3). Although the state government receives 
a smaller amount than the federal government the difference is not statistically significant (p > 0.10 in 
columns 4-6). Second, the coefficients of the variable good organization are 0.920 and 0.907 in columns 5 
and 6, respectively, significantly higher than the 0.201 and 0.199 in columns 2 and 3, respectively (p < 0.01).  
Therefore, to be able to solicit more funds, it is substantially more important for government agencies than 
for private charities to be perceived as good organizations.
9
  
We also investigate separately the determinants of the likelihood of giving and of gift size conditional 
on giving. Results are reported in Tables 7 and 8. Table 7 includes a random effect probit model with the 
likelihood of giving as the dependent variable. Table 8 includes a random effect linear regression and the 
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 Appendix E includes the tobit results by cause, which are consistent with Tables 5 and 6. 
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dependent variable is the gift size conditional on giving. The specifications and the set of independent 
variables are the same as in Table 5. Results in Tables 7 and 8 are largely consistent with results in Table 5. 
The exceptions are the variables Responsibility and non-Caucasian. The effect of Responsibility on the 
likelihood of giving is not significantly different from zero (as shown in Table 7) whereas its effect on the 
conditional gift is positive and significant (p < 0.05 in Table 8). It implies that whether it is the 
organization’s responsibility to provide a specific kind of service does not affect one’s decision on whether 
to give, but it does influence the amount of contribution if one decides to give. Ethnicity has a significant 
impact on the probability of giving (p < 0.05 in Table 7). Caucasians are more likely than non-Caucasians to 
make a voluntary contribution.  However, we can’t reject that Caucasians and non-Caucasians contribute the 
same amount conditional on the fact that they give (p > 0.10 in Table 8).  
 
IV. Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate the question of whether people will give to government, and if so, what 
determines the amount of giving.  We design a lab experiment in which participants make decisions on 
giving in the form of voluntary taxes paid to government agencies or giving in the form of voluntary 
donations to nonprofit charities which have similar missions. We find that people give an average amount of 
$4.4, i.e., 22 percent of their budget, to government when anonymity is ensured and giving is completely 
voluntary. People do show a preference for nonprofit charities by giving a higher amount, $5.30 (27 percent 
of their budget) to non-governmental organizations.  The willingness to give is influenced by the type, 
function and level of the organization, as well as perceptions of the organization. People give more to cancer 
research than to the three other causes.  National organizations (whether public or private) attract more 
contributions than do state or local organizations. Being perceived as serving an important cause, 
trustworthy, efficient, and providing a high quality of service increases the amount of giving.   
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Voluntary giving to government occurs in the U.S. through several mechanisms.  People have been 
able to make earmarked gifts to the federal government for reducing the national debt since 1961.
10
  Slemrod 
and Oltmans (2001) find that the size of such gifts is systematically related to attitudes toward government 
and the size of deficit. Taxpayers may also contribute to a special federal account called Gifts to the United 
States, maintained by the Department of Treasury since 1843. The amount of gifts totaled $394,000 in fiscal 
year 2001, and increased substantially after September 11, 2001 (Wall Street Journal, 2002). In addition, the 
state ―check-off‖ programs, through which taxpayers can make voluntary contributions to public or social 
programs via their state income tax, have been implemented since 1977, and have gained popularity over 
years.  In 2002, 210 such programs collected a total amount of $32.8 million.
11
 As of 2007, the number of 
such programs increased to 318.
12
 Appendix F summarizes these programs across the forty one states with 
broad-based personal income tax.  The most common programs as of year 2007 were to provide funding for 
nongame wildlife preservation, child abuse and neglect prevention, breast cancer research and prevention, 
and military families.  
  The functions we study in this paper, including cancer research, education, disaster relief, and 
environmental causes, parallel some of the popular categories in the check-off programs. Our findings offer 
some explanations on what makes these programs successful. This paper shows that, as confirmed in the 
practice of the state check-off programs, people are willing to pay voluntary tax when allowed to decide the 
use of their funds. In addition, organizations that are perceived as serving an important cause, trustworthy, 
efficient, and providing a high quality of service are more likely to attract funds. We also find that 
conditional on function, national organizations (whether public or private) get more contributions than do 
state or local organizations. It suggests the potential of broadening the check-off programs on the federal 
                                                 
10
 The Internal Revenue Service has included instructions in the tax packet on how to make a contribution since 1982 (Slemrod 
2003). 
11
 Data come from Federation of Tax Administrators (FTA) article ―Check-off Programs See Strong Growth‖. URL: 
http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/checkoff03.html. FTA conducted biannual surveys on state check-off programs from 1989 to 
2003.  
12
 According to the authors’ computation based on the 2007 U.S. states personal income tax return forms, 27 percent of these 
programs were private targeting charitable programs, 55 percent public and social programs, and the rest public/private 
combinations. 
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income tax return that included only one such program on political campaign as of 2007. Voluntary 
donations such as these may be a useful alternative source of funding for causes that are seen as salient to 
taxpayers, and where the government units that provide these services are seen as deserving of additional 
support. 
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Appendix A.  Description of Organizations 
Type of 
Organization 
Area 
Served 
by 
Charity 
Government Nonprofit 
Parks and 
Wildlife 
Services 
United 
States of 
America 
National Park Foundation 
Funds the National Park Service which is 
administered by the U.S. Department of 
the Interior. It is responsible for the 
development and maintenance of the 
national parks. 
National Park Trust 
A non-profit land conservancy. 
It is dedicated to preserving national 
parks, wildlife, and historic monuments. 
State of 
Texas 
Texas Parks and Wildlife Foundation 
Funds the Texas State Parks and Wildlife 
Department. The Department is dedicated 
to preserving Texas natural parks and 
wildlife. 
The Nature Conservancy of Texas 
A non-profit charity that concentrates on 
a science-based approach to conservation.  
It works to protect ecologically important 
lands and waters in Texas. 
Local 
Dallas 
Area 
Establishment of a White Rock Lake 
Museum 
Administered by the Dallas Parks and 
Recreation Department. The Museum will 
preserve the history of White Rock Lake 
Park and enhance the lake and park area. 
For the Love of the Lake 
A non-profit charity dedicated to 
preserving the White Rock Lake Park.  It 
maintains and enhances the lake and park 
through renovations and fundraising. 
Education 
United 
States of 
America 
Project Grad USA 
Run by the U.S. Department of 
Education.  The program focuses on 
improving the quality of public school 
education and increasing graduation rates. 
I Love Schools.com 
A non-profit charity focused on providing 
necessary supplies for classrooms. It 
connects donators with teachers who need 
supplies to increase the quality of 
education. 
State of 
Texas 
The College for Texans Campaign 
Funds the Texas Higher Education 
Coordinating Board.  The Board’s 
mission is to enhance the Texas education 
system and increase the percentage of 
students college bound. 
Texas Parent Teacher Association 
(PTA) 
A non-profit organization consisting of 
educators, parents and the general public.  
It unites efforts to achieve the highest 
possible education for all children. 
Local 
Dallas 
Area 
The Dallas Education Foundation 
Funds the Dallas Independent School 
District. It supports the city government’s 
initiatives to graduate high-achieving, 
engaged students ready for college. 
Communities in Schools Dallas Region 
A non-profit charity that works to reduce 
the number of high school dropouts. It 
encourages community involvement in 
Dallas area schools to enhance education. 
Cancer 
Research and 
Prevention 
United 
States of 
America 
National Cancer Institute Gift Fund 
Part of the National Institute of Health.  It 
is the federal government’s principal 
agency for cancer research, training, and 
treatments in clinical practice. 
American Cancer Society (ACS) 
A non-profit organization for cancer 
research, education, advocacy and 
service.  Its goal is to prevent cancer, save 
lives, and diminish suffering from cancer. 
 
State of 
Texas 
Texas Cancer Council 
Created by Texas Legislature to support 
the Texas Cancer Plan.  The Plan 
promotes cancer prevention research and 
aids cancer patients with treatment and 
recovery. 
Young Texans Against Cancer (YTAC) 
A non-profit charity comprised of young 
men and women affected directly or 
indirectly by cancer.  It raised funds to 
help support research and prevention 
programs. 
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Type of 
Organization 
Area 
Served 
by 
Charity 
Government Nonprofit 
Local 
Dallas 
Area 
Parkland Foundation, Oncology 
Department 
Fund the Parkland Health and Hospital 
System’s Oncology Department.  It helps 
cancer patients in the most trying times of 
their lives by providing access to a variety 
of cancer-related treatments. 
 
Baylor Medical Center’s Charles A. 
Sammons Cancer Center 
A non-profit system that offers treatment 
for all types of cancer.  The Center also 
offers a full spectrum of oncology 
services from education to advanced 
rehabilitation programs. 
Disaster 
Relief 
United 
States of 
America 
Corporation for National and 
Community Service Disaster Relief 
Fund 
An independent federal agency whose 
efforts focus on meeting people’s 
immediate emergency disaster-caused 
needs.  It also provides strategic critical 
support to volunteer organizations. 
 
American Red Cross Disaster Relief 
Fund 
A non-profit charity that focuses on 
providing aid to disaster victims 
nationwide.  It meets people’s immediate 
emergency disaster-caused needs for 
shelter, food, and health services. 
State of 
Texas 
Texas Disaster Relief Fund 
Established by the Office of the Texas 
Governor.  It provides funds for 
immediate emergency assistance to 
Texans in need due to a disaster. 
 
United Way of Texas 
A non-profit charity dedicated to meeting 
the needs of people across the state.  It 
enables health and human services to get 
back in operation after a disaster. 
Local 
Dallas 
Area 
Dallas City Office of Emergency 
Management 
Run by the City of Dallas.  It warns of 
disaster events, provides disaster-related 
safety information to the public, and 
trains Dallas city rescue workers in 
disaster relief. 
North Texas Rescue 
A non-profit charity that provides support 
to North Texas residents in disasters. 
Assistance focuses on financial, housing, 
emotional support and long-term benefits 
for displaced individuals. 
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Appendix B.  Sample Instructions and Allocation Forms 
 
Instructions 
 
You are going to participate in a study of decision making.  The study will last about 50 minutes.  Some of you 
will receive compensation for your participation, which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the study.  How 
you will be compensated is explained below. 
 
For today’s experiment I will select a MONITOR who will be paid $20 for helping me with the experiment.  
The MONITOR is responsible for verifying that all the decisions are made according to the instructions.  The 
MONITOR is also responsible for making sure that any money donated to organizations in the course of the 
experiment actually gets mailed to the organization.  The MONITOR will be responsible for distributing any 
earnings in the experiment. 
 
Each subject has been given a set of INSTRUCTIONS, DECISION SHEETS, an ENVELOPE and an INDEX 
CARD. 
 
To insure the anonymity of all subjects’ decisions, each subject has been assigned randomly a five-digit code 
number.  This number is written on an index card that has been distributed to you.  Please keep this card: it is 
your claim check to pick up your earnings.  You will collect your compensation by turning in this code 
number. 
 
Please write your code number on your INSTRUCTIONS and DECISION SHEET now. 
 
The DECISION SHEET contains a series of allocation problems.  You will be asked to make an allocation 
decision for each of these problems.  In each allocation problem you are paired with an organization of either a 
government agency or a non-government charity.  For each allocation problem you have been given an 
endowment, i.e., an initial amount of money.  You are asked to allocate this money between yourself and the 
organization.  It is important that you pay careful attention to the organization and the endowment as you make 
each decision.  We will explain how to make the decisions in more detail later. 
 
After you complete the DECISION SHEET you will be given a SURVEY to fill out.  While you are filling out 
your survey we will calculate your earnings. 
 
When everyone is finished making their decisions, we will pick six people at random from the class.  These six 
people will be paid in cash for their participation.   If you are one of the six people, we will pay you for ONE of 
the decisions you made.  This will be explained in more detail at the end of the instructions. We will put your 
payment in an envelope with your code number on it.  After earnings are calculated, the MONITOR will return 
with the envelopes for the people who are going to be paid.  The code numbers for these people will be 
announced.  To pick up your earnings, you need to show your code number.   
 
The experimenters will also calculate the total donation to each of the organizations.  The experimenters will 
make out checks for these amounts, and place them in addressed and stamped envelopes.  The experimenter and 
the MONITOR will go to the nearest mailbox and drop the envelope in the mailbox. 
 
If you wish to remain behind after class to learn how much has been donated to each organization and to verify 
that the checks are written and mailed, you are welcome to do so. 
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Examples of Allocation Problems: 
Let’s look at Example 1 for an allocation problem in the chart below. In this problem you are matched with the National 
Park Service, a federal government agency that serves the entire nation of the U.S. You must divide $10.00 between this 
organization and yourself.  You can keep it all, keep some and pass some, or pass it all.  For instance, suppose you elect to 
pass $7.00 and keep $3.00.  I have filled in the table to show how you would indicate that choice.  If this were your 
decision, the National Park Service would receive $7.00 and you would earn $3.00.  
Example 1: 
Problem Endowment Organizations 
Government or Non-
government 
Organization 
Area Served  
by the 
Organization 
Pass to the 
Organization 
Keep for 
Self 
1 $10.00 
National Park Service  
Administered by the U.S. 
Department of the Interior. It is 
responsible for the development and 
maintenance of the national parks.  
Government 
agency 
U. S. $7.00 $3.00 
 
Let’s look at Example 2. In this problem you are matched with the Communities in Schools Dallas Region, a local non-
government charity that serves the Dallas area. You must divide $10.00 between this charity and yourself.  You can keep it 
all, keep some and pass some, or pass it all.  For instance, suppose you elect to pass $4.12 and keep $5.88.  I have filled in 
the table to show how you would indicate that choice.  If this were your decision, the Communities in Schools Dallas 
Region would receive $4.12 and you would earn $5.88. 
 
Example 2: 
Problem Endowment Organizations 
Government or 
Non-government 
Organization 
Area Served  
by the 
Organization 
Pass to the 
Organization 
Keep for 
Self 
2 $10.00 
Communities in Schools Dallas 
Region 
A non-profit charity that works to 
reduce the number of high school 
dropouts. It encourages community 
involvement in Dallas area schools 
to enhance education.   
Non-government 
charity 
Local Dallas 
Area 
$4.12 $5.88 
 
Important Note:  In all cases you may choose any amount to keep and any amount to pass, but the 
amount you keep plus the amount you pass must equal your endowment. The decision is up to you.    
 
When you are done, Please place the DECISION SHEET in the provided envelope and seal the envelope.  The 
experimenters will collect the envelopes at this time. But keep the card with your code on it.  
 
After completing these tasks, the experimenters will hand out a survey.  Please write your five-digit code 
number on the survey form.   Please note that the survey will be used for research purposes only.  We will 
collect the completed survey forms. 
  
Remember that, while you are completing the survey, the experimenters will be determining your compensation 
and donation to the organizations.  We will choose six people at random to pay in cash for participating.  If you 
are chosen for payment, one of your decisions will be chosen at random for payment. Your compensation, the 
amount you kept for yourself, will be sealed in an envelope with your code number on its face.  You may pick 
up your envelope at the end of the study.  Similarly, a check for the amount you passed to the organization will 
be mailed by the experimenter and monitor at the end of the study.  
 
If you have any questions about the procedures, please ask now.
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Allocation Forms 
 
For this study, each of you will be paired with 12 different organizations of two categories. Page 2 contains 
organizations that benefit Parks and Wildlife, and page 3 contains organizations that benefit Education. Each 
category has 6 decisions in which allocations are to be made between yourself and the organizations.  These 
organizations either are part of varying levels of government such as the U.S. federal government, the Texas 
state government and the Dallas local government, or are non-government charities that serve different 
geographic areas such as the U.S., the State of Texas and the local Dallas area.  Information on these 
organizations is provided. You may also refer to the separate green sheets for more detailed descriptions of these 
organizations.  
 
Read each allocation problem carefully.  Notice that for each problem you are given an endowment.  The 
endowment is $20.  You must make a decision for each problem below.   
 
If you are picked to be paid you and the organization will be paid according to ONE of the decisions that you 
make.  However, you will not know which decision is the one you will be paid for until the end.  So it is 
important to make each decision as if that is the one you will be paid for.   
 
Remember that you can allocate your endowment in any way you like. You may:   
1)  keep it all for yourself, 
2)  keep some for yourself and pass the remainder to the organization, or 
3)  pass it all to the organization. 
The amount you keep plus the amount you pass must equal your endowment. The decision is up to you. 
 
If you are picked to be paid, one of these decisions will be chosen and you will be paid in cash and the 
organization will receive a check based upon the allocations you gave in the decision. 
 
This is how the payment will work.  First, 6 envelopes will be drawn by the monitor: three will be matched with 
each of the two categories, i.e., Parks and Wildlife, or Education.  Then for each of the chosen envelopes, a 6-
sided die will be rolled to determine which decision is paid.  For example, suppose your envelope is drawn for 
the Parks and Wildlife category.   Suppose the die comes up 4.  Then we will pay you for decision 4 for the 
Parks and Wildlife category on page 2, and send a check to The Nature Conservancy of Texas. 
 
. 
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For these 6 problems, you are matched with Parks and Wildlife organizations including government agencies and non-government charities.  Any money you 
pass will be mailed to the organization randomly selected at the end of the experiment. 
 
Problem Endowment Organizations 
Government or 
Non-government 
Organization 
Area Served by 
the Organization 
Pass to the 
Organization 
Keep for Self 
1 $20 
National Park Foundation 
Funds the National Park Service which is 
administered by the U.S. Department of the 
Interior. It is responsible for the development 
and maintenance of the national parks.  
Government 
agency  
U. S.  
  
2 $20 
National Park Trust  
A non-profit land conservancy.  
It is dedicated to preserving national parks, 
wildlife, and historic monuments. 
Non-government 
charity 
U. S. 
  
3 $20 
Texas Parks and Wildlife Foundation 
Funds the Texas State Parks and Wildlife 
Department. The Department is dedicated to 
preserving Texas natural parks and wildlife.  
Government 
agency 
State of Texas 
  
4 $20 
The Nature Conservancy of Texas 
A non-profit charity that concentrates on a 
science-based approach to conservation.  It 
works to protect ecologically important lands 
and waters in Texas.  
Non-government 
charity 
State of Texas 
  
5 $20 
Establishment of a White Rock Lake 
Museum 
Administered by the Dallas Parks and 
Recreation Department. The Museum will 
preserve the history of White Rock Lake Park 
and enhance the lake and park area.   
Government 
agency 
Local Dallas Area 
  
6 $20 
For the Love of the Lake 
A non-profit charity dedicated to preserving 
the White Rock Lake Park.  It maintains and 
enhances the lake and park through 
renovations and fundraising. 
Non-government 
charity 
Local Dallas Area 
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For these 6 problems, you are matched with Education organizations including government agencies and non-government charities.  Any money you pass 
will be mailed to the organization randomly selected at the end of the experiment. 
 
Problem Endowment Organizations 
Government or 
Non-government 
Organization 
Area Served by 
the Organization 
Pass to the 
Organization 
Keep for Self 
1 $20 
Project Grad USA 
Run by the U.S. Department of Education.  
The program focuses on improving the quality 
of public school education and increasing 
graduation rates.   
Government 
agency 
U. S. 
  
2 $20 
I Love Schools.com  
A non-profit charity focused on providing 
necessary supplies for classrooms. It connects 
donators with teachers who need supplies to 
increase the quality of education.   
Non-government 
charity 
U. S. 
  
3 $20 
The College for Texans Campaign 
Funds the Texas Higher Education 
Coordinating Board.  The Board’s mission is 
to enhance the Texas education system and 
increase the percentage of students college 
bound.  
Government 
agency 
State of Texas 
  
4 $20 
Texas Parent Teacher Association (PTA) 
A non-profit organization consisting of 
educators, parents and the general public.  It 
unites efforts to achieve the highest possible 
education for all children. 
Non-government 
charity 
State of Texas 
  
5 $20 
The Dallas Education Foundation  
Funds the Dallas Independent School District. 
It supports the city government’s initiatives to 
graduate high-achieving, engaged students 
ready for college. 
Government 
agency 
Local Dallas Area 
  
6 $20 
Communities in Schools Dallas Region 
A non-profit charity that works to reduce the 
number of high school dropouts. It encourages 
community involvement in Dallas area 
schools to enhance education.   
Non-government 
charity 
Local Dallas Area 
  
 Appendix C. Post-Experimental Survey 
 
The first question was asked once for each function. 
1. To what extent do you agree or disagree that supporting cancer research and prevention is 
an important cause? (1=strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) 
 
The following questions were asked separately for each type and level of organization (e.g., local 
government, local charity, etc.) 
 
2. How much do you trust the following organizations in providing cancer research and 
prevention? (1=strongly distrust, 5=strongly trust) 
3. To what extent do you agree or disagree that to provide cancer research and prevention is 
the responsibility of the following organizations? (1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly 
agree) 
4. How many resources do you think the following organizations spend annually in cancer 
research and prevention?  (1=low spending, 5=high spending) 
5. Please evaluate the quality of the work done by the following organizations in 
supporting cancer research and prevention. (1=poor, 5=excellent) 
6. How many additional resources do you think the following organizations need in order 
to provide better cancer research and prevention? (1=little resources, 5=lots of resources) 
7. How confident are you that donations to the following cancer research and prevention 
organizations will be used efficiently? (1=not very confident at all, 5=very confident) 
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Appendix D. Summary Statistics on the Perceptions of Organizations 
Organization Perception Means (Std. Dev.) 
 Q1: 
Important 
Cause 
Q2: Trust Q3: 
Responsibility 
Q4: 
Resources 
Q5: 
Quality 
Q6: Need Q7: 
Efficiency 
Cancer 4.30 (0.82)       
National Govt.   3.21 (1.16) 4.26 (0.97) 3.20 (1.33) 3.02 (1.04) 3.21 (1.28) 2.57 (1.35) 
State Govt.  3.11 (0.84) 3.62 (1.09) 2.66 (1.01) 2.70 (0.83) 3.53 (0.93) 2.38 (1.09) 
Local Govt.  2.94 (0.76) 3.28 (1.28) 2.19 (1.06) 2.35 (0.85) 3.60 (1.19) 2.45 (1.14) 
National 
Charity 
 3.70 (0.95) 3.60 (0.99) 3.77 (0.89) 3.64 (0.92) 3.64 (1.19) 3.66 (1.22) 
State Charity  3.62 (0.68) 3.15 (0.93) 3.06 (0.76) 3.26 (0.83) 3.85 (0.98) 3.40 (1.10) 
Local Charity  3.64 (0.85) 2.91 (0.97) 2.72 (0.98) 3.02 (0.84) 4.04 (1.19) 3.47 (1.04) 
        
Education 4.59 (0.70)       
National Govt.   2.72 (1.36) 4.14 (1.16) 3.22 (1.23) 2.30 (1.07) 3.20 (1.46) 2.14 (1.18) 
State Govt.  2.80 (1.23) 4.56 (0.79) 3.52 (1.22) 2.68 (1.13) 3.56 (1.18) 2.52 (1.11) 
Local Govt.  2.88 (1.30) 4.34 (0.92) 3.20 (1.11) 2.68 (1.02) 3.66 (1.29) 2.80 (1.36) 
National 
Charity 
 3.26 (1.19) 2.78 (1.31) 3.14 (1.13) 2.76 (1.04) 3.54 (1.27) 3.06 (1.25) 
State Charity  3.22 (0.97) 2.88 (1.29) 3.10 (1.16) 2.88 (1.04) 3.74 (1.14) 3.24 (1.13) 
Local Charity  3.16 (1.04) 2.80 (1.25) 2.98 (1.19) 2.78 (0.82) 3.66 (1.17) 3.35 (1.25) 
        
Parks and 
Wildlife 
3.62 (0.85)       
National Govt.   3.11 (1.23) 3.67 (1.27) 2.78 (1.35) 3.11 (1.06) 3.02 (1.31) 2.74 (1.32) 
State Govt.  3.26 (0.88) 4.26 (0.53) 2.85 (0.99) 3.26 (0.98) 3.11 (1.16) 2.93 (1.12) 
Local Govt.  3.50 (0.78) 4.07 (0.90) 2.59 (1.00) 2.98 (0.95) 3.22 (1.13) 3.00 (1.19) 
National 
Charity 
 3.59 (0.83) 2.78 (1.09) 2.96 (1.17) 3.11 (1.06) 3.28 (1.15) 3.15 (1.19) 
State Charity  3.60 (0.75) 3.02 (1.14) 2.89 (1.04) 3.13 (1.07) 3.37 (1.10) 3.37 (1.08) 
Local Charity  3.67 (0.87) 3.02 (1.18) 2.76 (1.18) 3.09 (1.09) 3.60 (1.18) 3.52 (1.11) 
        
Disaster Relief 4.16 (0.72)       
National Govt.   2.56 (1.22) 4.26 (1.03) 3.02 (1.47) 2.26 (1.11) 3.05 (1.33) 2.30 (1.28) 
State Govt.  3.37 (0.90) 4.26 (0.82) 2.77 (1.21) 2.95 (1.11) 3.16 (1.23) 2.77 (1.21) 
Local Govt.  3.53 (0.93) 4.16 (0.95) 2.56 (1.01) 2.84 (0.97) 3.30 (1.28) 3.14 (1.13) 
National 
Charity 
 3.79 (1.01) 3.67 (0.89) 3.47 (1.05) 3.51 (1.01) 3.74 (0.93) 3.56 (0.98) 
State Charity  3.79 (0.80) 3.60 (0.86) 3.05 (0.92) 3.47 (0.88) 3.70 (1.04) 3.56 (0.88) 
Local Charity  3.88 (0.88) 3.62 (1.01) 2.93 (0.99) 3.53 (0.88) 3.70 (1.17) 3.67 (1.06) 
 
 
  
Appendix E: Random Effect Tobit Model by Cause  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Cause Cancer Cancer Cancer Education Education Education P&W P&W P&W Disaster Disaster Disaster 
Experiment variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Perceptions  yes yes  yes yes  yes yes  yes yes 
Demographics     yes     yes     yes     yes 
charity 2.276*** 1.055 1.033 -0.003 0.335 0.267 0.515 0.667 0.636 3.140*** 2.833*** 2.891*** 
 (0.530) (0.691) (0.691) (0.555) (0.840) (0.840) (0.554) (0.713) (0.712) (0.534) (0.659) (0.658) 
Texas -0.786 0.224 0.214 -1.441** -1.862*** -1.852*** -0.0969 -0.294 -0.289 -2.183*** -2.339*** -2.321*** 
 (0.646) (0.677) (0.678) (0.667) (0.683) (0.683) (0.649) (0.684) (0.684) (0.646) (0.652) (0.652) 
Dallas 0.334 1.776** 1.764** -2.351*** -2.579*** -2.570*** -4.508*** -4.161*** -4.161*** -2.603*** -2.766*** -2.742*** 
 (0.642) (0.721) (0.721) (0.685) (0.695) (0.695) (0.712) (0.739) (0.739) (0.650) (0.660) (0.660) 
cancer-disaster 5.698*** 5.132*** 4.915***       4.950** 6.117*** 5.405** 
 (2.028) (1.820) (1.718)       (2.202) (2.352) (2.154) 
cancer-education    -0.0895 -0.0286 -1.548       
    (2.086) (2.139) (2.207)       
P&W-disaster       -1.469 -0.108 -0.453    
       (2.645) (2.389) (2.575)    
important cause  2.805** 2.329**  -0.824 -0.804  4.129*** 4.063***  1.623 1.681 
  (1.130) (1.138)  (1.504) (1.456)  (1.406) (1.524)  (1.640) (1.567) 
good organizations  2.278*** 2.295***  1.194*** 1.193***  0.691 0.707  1.044** 0.964** 
  (0.533) (0.532)  (0.452) (0.452)  (0.596) (0.597)  (0.488) (0.489) 
responsibility  0.206 0.173  0.280 0.239  0.305 0.278  0.460 0.473 
  (0.347) (0.346)  (0.379) (0.380)  (0.385) (0.385)  (0.361) (0.360) 
female   4.586**   4.514*   2.150   5.624*** 
   (1.919)   (2.352)   (2.714)   (2.125) 
non_Caucasian   -1.976   -0.335   -1.279   -0.903 
   (1.923)   (2.389)   (2.889)   (2.223) 
age   0.0149   -0.0967   -0.160   -0.0808 
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   (0.228)   (0.367)   (0.546)   (0.279) 
Constant 1.601 -10.97** -10.97 2.371 5.385 6.291 2.040 -14.48** -11.13 1.519 -7.613 -8.798 
 (1.551) (5.233) (6.747) (1.491) (6.903) (9.959) (1.749) (5.627) (11.09) (1.739) (7.653) (9.375) 
L.L.F. -663 -613 -611 -563 -540 -538 -484 -428 -427 -589 -580 -577 
Observations 282 265 265 300 291 291 276 250 250 258 256 256 
Number of person 47 46 46 50 49 49 46 42 42 43 43 43 
  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 
Appendix F.  Voluntary Contributions Accepted on the State Personal Income Tax Returns 
  
  Wildlife Child 
Abuse 
Breast 
Cancer 
Military 
Families 
Other 
Alabama x x x  1,2,3,5,6,7,8,23,31,49,82,84 
Arizona x x   3,8,9,10,11,12,13,49 
Arkansas    x 14,15,16,19,31,69,86 
California x x x x 18,19,20,21,22,87,88 
Colorado x  x x 3,9,10,11,18,25,27,28,29,36,38 
Connecticut x  x x 30,31,32 
Delaware  x   3,14,31,33,34,49,89 
District of  
Columbia 
    52,90 
Georgia x x   23,27,49,55,91 
Hawaii  x   35,72 
Idaho x x   49,92 
Illinois x x x x 3,18,24,25,30,34,38 
Indiana x     
Iowa x    3,12,39,40 
Kansas x  x  41,46 
Kentucky x x x  3, 
Louisiana x   x 23,33,93,94,95 
Maine  x  x 3,12,24,27,96 
Maryland x    13,23 
Massachusetts x   x 14,30,31 
Michigan  x  x 93,  
Minnesota x     
Mississippi x   x 4,10,47,97 
Missouri  x  x 1,3,23,24,34,49,65,69,78,83,85,98,99, 
100,101 
Montana x x   50,77 
Nebraska x    13,  
New Jersey x x x  10,30,31,37,48,51,52,53,53* 
New Mexico x    3,10,12,49,52,54,101 
New York x  x  14,37,57,63 
North 
Carolina 
x     
North Dakota x    4 
Ohio x   x 4 
Oklahoma x  x  1,3,10,16,27,28,31,35,39,45,48,49, 
56,57,58,75 
Oregon x x x x 3,4,4*,9,11,16,18,26,30,34,44,59, 
60,61,62,64,66,66*,67 
Pennsylvania   x x 4,31,89 
Rhode Island x   x 14,31,52,68,69 
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South 
Carolina 
x x  x 1,3,4,4*,10,42,43,62,70,71,73 
Utah x    4,25,27,31,35 
Vermont x x   12,  
Virginia x x   1,4,4*,12,14,17,23,26,27,33,35,36, 
48,48*,55,57,68,73,74,75,76,79,80 
West Virginia  x    
Wisconsin     x   3,4,20,37,38,81 
Notes:  
* When a category is listed more than once within a state, that state has different check-off programs in that same 
category. 
1. Senior Services, 2. Arts Fund, 3. Veterans, 4. Nature Conservancy, 5. Indian Children, 6. Foster Care, 7. Mental 
Health, 8. Neighbors Helping Neighbors, 9. Special Olympics, 10. Education, 11. Domestic Violence, 12. Political 
Parties/ Campaigns, 13. Clean Elections, 14. Olympic Fund, 15. Disaster Relief Fund, 16. School for Blind/Deaf, 17. 
Office of Commonwealth Preparedness, 18. Alzheimers, 19. Fund of Senior Citizens, 20. Firefighters, 21. Peace 
Officer Memorial, 22. Emergency Food, 23. Cancer, 24. Asthma/Lung Disease, 25. Homeless, 26. Humane Society, 
27. Pet Overpopulation, 28. Special Advocates, 29.Watershed Protection, 30. AIDS, 31. Organ Transplant, 32. Safety 
Net, 33. Housing Fund, 34. Diabetes, 35. School Support/Repair, 36. Family Services, 37. Prostate Cancer, 38. 
Multiple Sclerosis, 39. State Fairgrounds, 40. Keep Iowa Beautiful, 41. Meals on Wheels, 42. Financial Literacy, 43. 
Parks, 44. Planned Parenthood, 45. Retirement of Capital Dome, 46. Military Emergency Relief Fund, 47. Volunteer 
Service, 48. Scholarship Fund, 49. National Guard, 50. Agriculture in Schools, 51. USS New Jersey, 52. Drug 
Abuse, 53. Korean or Vietnam Veterans' Memorial, 54. Forest re-leaf, 55. Natural Areas, 56. Medicaid, 57. 
Memorials, 58. Roads and Highways, 59. Habitat for Humanity, 60. Head Start, 61. Coast Aquarium, 62. Early 
Literacy, 63. Missing/Exploited Children’s Fund, 64. St. Vincent de Paul Society, 65. Arthritis, 66. Childrens' 
Hospital, 67. Salvation Army, 68. Arts & Tourism, 69. Childhood Disease, 70. Gift of Life, 71. Civil War Heritage, 
72. Libraries, 73. Community Policing, 74. Historic Resources, 75. Uninsured Medical Fund, 76. Humanities & 
Public Policy, 77. Renal Disease, 78. Multiple Sclerosis, 79. Jamestown-Yorktown, 80. Children of America Finding 
Hope, 81. Packers Football Stadium, 82. Youth Advocacy, 83. Muscular Dystrophy, 84. Alternative fuel, 85. 
Cervical Cancer, 86. Umbilical Cord Blood Initiative, 87. CA senior special fund, 88. CA sea otter Fund, 89. 
Juvenile Diabetes, 90. DC Statehood Delegation Fund, 91. Stem Cell Research, 92. American Red Cross, 93. College 
Savings, 94. Animal Welfare, 95. Health, 96. Bone Marrow Screening Fund, 97. Burn Care, 98. Worker’s Memorial, 
99. Childhood Lead Testing, 100. General Revenue, 101. Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis Fund  
Table 1:  Means Tests of Giving – Matched Pairs and Conditional of Giving 
 
Matched Pairs 
Drop Participants who 
Always Kept Everything 
Conditional on Donation > 
$0 
Mean 
(Std. dev.) 
N 
Two-
tail 
t-stat* 
 
Correlation 
(p value) 
Mean 
(Std. dev.) 
N 
Two-
tail 
t-stat* 
 
Mean 
(Std. dev.) 
N 
Two-
tail 
t-stat* 
 Category Level Gov’t Private Gov’t Private Gov’t Private 
Cancer 
National 
$5.61 
(5.41) 
47 
$7.89 
(6.18) 
47 
3.40 
 
0.69 
(0.00) 
 
$5.99 
(5.38) 
44 
$8.43 
(6.02) 
44 
 
3.43 
$8.50 
(4.41) 
31 
$9.27 
(5.65) 
40 
0.64 
 
State 
$5.55 
(5.55) 
47 
$6.94 
(5.94) 
47 
1.69 
 
0.52 
(0.00) 
 
$5.93 
(5.53) 
44 
$7.41 
(5.84) 
44 
 
1.69 
$8.42 
(4.72) 
31 
$8.81 
(5.30) 
37 
0.32 
 
Local 
$6.51 
(6.18) 
47 
$7.18 
(6.00) 
47 
1.13 
 
0.78 
(0.00) 
 
$6.95 
(6.14) 
44 
$7.67 
(5.88) 
44 
 
1.13 
$8.74 
(5.62) 
35 
$8.44 
(5.61) 
40 
0.23 
 
All  
$5.89 
(5.70) 
141 
$7.34 
(6.01) 
141 
 
3.56 
0.66 
(0.00) 
$6.29 
(5.67) 
132 
$7.84 
(5.89) 
132 
 
3.57 
$8.56 
(4.92)  
97 
$8.84 
(5.49) 
117 
0.39 
            
Education 
National 
$4.14 
(4.74) 
50 
$4.40 
(4.98) 
50 
0.42 
 
0.60 
(0.00) 
 
$4.93 
(4.78) 
42 
$5.24 
(5.01) 
42 
 
0.42 
$6.90 
(4.27) 
30 
$6.67 
(4.73) 
33 
0.21 
 
State 
$4.08 
(5.00) 
50 
$2.84 
(4.06) 
50 
2.04 
 
0.57 
(0.00) 
 
$4.86 
(5.10) 
42 
$3.38 
(4.23) 
42 
 
2.05 
$7.03 
(4.72) 
29 
$5.92 
(4.02) 
24 
0.93 
 
Local 
$2.80 
(4.29) 
50 
$3.48 
(4.85) 
50 
1.69 
 
0.81 
(0.00) 
 
$3.33 
(4.49) 
42 
$4.14 
(5.02) 
42 
 
1.69 
$6.36 
(4.37) 
22 
$6.96 
(4.77) 
25 
0.45 
 
All 
$3.67 
(4.69) 
150 
$3.57 
(4.66) 
150 
 
0.31 
0.64 
(0.00) 
$4.37 
(4.81) 
126 
$4.25 
(4.79) 
126 
 
0.31 
$6.80 
(4.41) 
81 
$6.54 
( 4.51) 
82 
0.38 
            
Parks and 
Wildlife 
National 
$4.42 
(5.43) 
46 
$4.22 
(4.80) 
46 
0.40 
 
0.78 
(0.00) 
 
$5.65 
(5.55) 
36 
$5.39 
(4.81) 
36 
 
0.40 
$7.26 
(5.27) 
28 
$6.69 
(4.46) 
29 
0.44 
 
State 
$4.23 
(5.36) 
46 
$4.25 
(5.01) 
46 
0.04 
 
0.78 
(0.00) 
 
$5.40 
(5.51) 
36 
$5.43 
(5.07) 
36 
 
0.04 
$7.20 
(5.23) 
27 
$6.98 
(4.70) 
28 
0.17 
 
Local 
$1.78 
(3.89) 
46 
$2.53 
(4.35) 
46 
1.50 
 
0.67 
(0.00) 
 
$2.28 
(4.27) 
36 
$3.24 
(4.69) 
36 
 
1.51 
 
$5.86 
(5.16) 
14 
$6.13 
(4.89) 
19 
0.15 
 
All 
$3.48 
(5.05) 
138 
$3.67 
(4.76) 
138 
 
0.65 
0.76 
(0.00) 
$4.44 
(5.33) 
108 
$4.69 
(4.92) 
108 
 
0.65 
$6.95 
(5.19) 
69 
$6.66 
( 4.61) 
76 
0.36 
            
Disaster 
Relief 
National 
$5.02 
(5.38) 
43 
$8.76 
(6.97) 
43 
4.00 
 
0.53 
(0.00) 
 
$5.68 
(5.38) 
38 
$9.91 
(6.59) 
38 
 
4.10 
$7.45 
(4.97) 
29 
$10.18 
(6.47) 
37 
1.94 
 
State 
$4.49 
(4.65) 
43 
$5.94 
(5.80) 
43 
2.31 
 
0.71 
(0.00) 
 
$5.08 
(4.63) 
38 
$6.72 
(5.72) 
38 
 
2.33 
$6.43 
(4.29) 
30 
$7.74 
(5.45) 
33 
1.06 
 
Local 
$4.27 
(5.10) 
43 
$5.73 
(5.57) 
43 
2.22 
 
0.68 
(0.00) 
 
$4.83 
(5.17) 
38 
$6.49 
(5.49) 
38 
 
2.24 
$6.80 
(4.92) 
27 
$7.47 
(5.23) 
33 
0.51 
 
All 
$4.59 
(5.02) 
129 
$6.81 
(6.25) 
129 
5.02 
0.62 
(0.00) 
$5.20 
(5.04) 
114 
$7.71 
(6.11) 
114 
 
5.08 
$6.89 
(4.69) 
86 
$8.53 
(5.85) 
103 
2.10 
* Significant t-statistics (p-value < 0.10) in bold. 
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Table 2:  Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Rank Test p-values 
 
 
Cancer 
(N = 47) 
Education 
(N = 50) 
Parks and Wildlife 
(N = 46) 
Disaster Relief 
(N = 43) 
National 0.001 0.712 0.968 0.000 
State 0.221 0.170 0.991 0.069 
Local 0.011 0.062 0.102 0.016 
 
 
 
Table 3:  Probability of Giving (McNemar’s Test) 
 
 
Government 
(%) 
Private 
(%) 
McNemar’s Test 
p-value 
 Cancer (N = 47) 
National 66.0 85.1 0.003 
State 66.0 78.7 0.034 
Local 74.5 85.1 0.059 
All 68.8 83.0 0.000 
 Education (N = 50) 
National 60.0 66.0 0.439 
State 58.0 48.0 0.275 
Local 44.0 50.0 0.317 
 All 54.0 54.7 0.721 
 Parks and Wildlife (N = 46) 
National 60.9 63.0 0.655 
State 58.7 60.9 0.739 
Local 30.4 41.3 0.059 
All 50.0 55.1 0.418 
 Disaster Relief (N = 43) 
National 67.4 86.0 0.005 
State 69.8 76.7 0.257 
Local 62.8 76.7 0.034 
All 66.7 79.8 0.000 
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Table 4:  Comparison of Perceptions on Government and Charities  
(p values for t test for paired sample) 
 
  Trust Responsibility Resources Quality Need Efficiency 
Cancer             
National 0.014 0.001 0.017 0.002 0.049 0.000 
State 0.001 0.014 0.031 0.001 0.054 0.000 
Local 0.000 0.063 0.015 0.000 0.037 0.000 
All 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 
Education             
National 0.019 0.000 0.736 0.016 0.108 0.000 
State 0.031 0.000 0.081 0.180 0.220 0.001 
Local 0.119 0.000 0.340 0.295 0.500 0.020 
 All 0.001 0.000 0.077 0.017 0.116 0.000 
Parks & 
Wildlife             
National 0.016 0.000 0.511 0.500 0.156 0.060 
State 0.026 0.000 0.837 0.729 0.136 0.031 
Local 0.158 0.000 0.447 0.306 0.059 0.016 
All 0.001 0.000 0.336 0.523 0.017 0.001 
Disaster relief             
National 0.000 0.003 0.113 0.000 0.003 0.000 
State 0.013 0.000 0.233 0.010 0.016 0.000 
Local 0.039 0.006 0.087 0.000 0.069 0.013 
All 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: The hypothesis for Trust, Quality, Need, and Efficiency is ―government < charity‖.  
The hypothesis for Responsibility is ―government > charity‖. The hypothesis for Resources is ―government = 
charity‖. As shown in Appendix D, according to participants’ perception, government spends more resources 
than charity at all levels for Education. The direction of comparison is reversed for all other causes.  
Table 5: Random Effect Tobit Model on Unconditional Giving (All causes pooled) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Experiment variables yes yes yes yes 
Perceptions  yes yes yes 
Demographics   yes yes 
Charity-Cause interactions     yes 
Charity 1.539*** 1.406*** 1.401***  
 (0.285) (0.351) (0.351)  
Education -2.194*** -2.036*** -2.054*** -1.268* 
 (0.514) (0.525) (0.525) (0.665) 
P&W -2.365*** -2.118*** -2.113*** -1.406* 
 (0.584) (0.622) (0.621) (0.751) 
Disaster relief -1.378*** -1.619*** -1.618*** -1.987*** 
 (0.452) (0.462) (0.462) (0.608) 
Texas -1.149*** -1.205*** -1.206*** -1.208*** 
 (0.344) (0.345) (0.345) (0.342) 
Dallas -2.105*** -1.864*** -1.866*** -1.880*** 
 (0.349) (0.353) (0.353) (0.350) 
Cancer-Disaster 4.952** 5.039** 3.429* 3.445* 
 (2.126) (2.083) (2.050) (2.054) 
Cancer-Education -0.208 -0.364 -1.769 -1.854 
 (2.142) (2.096) (2.065) (2.062) 
P&W-Disaster -0.749 -0.849 -1.854 -2.018 
 (2.279) (2.230) (2.166) (2.162) 
charity*cancer    1.524* 
    (0.801) 
charity*education    0.135 
    (0.314) 
charity*P&W    0.229 
    (0.841) 
charity*disaster    2.363*** 
    (0.807) 
important cause  0.583** 0.589** 0.591** 
  (0.266) (0.265) (0.263) 
good organization  1.244*** 1.239*** 1.146*** 
  (0.235) (0.235) (0.235) 
responsibility  0.335** 0.327* 0.236 
  (0.170) (0.170) (0.172) 
female   4.674*** 4.347*** 
   (1.592) (1.505) 
non_Caucasian   -1.104  
   (1.615)  
age   -0.001  
   (0.225)  
Constant 3.487** -0.133 -1.044 -1.139 
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 (1.547) (1.994) (4.941) (1.984) 
L.L.F. -2254 -2125 -2121 -2116 
Observations 1116 1062 1062 1062 
Number of persons 93 92 92 92 
Dependent variable: unconditional giving. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*     - significant at the 10% level  
**   - significant at the 5% level 
*** - significant at the 1% level 
 
 
Table 6: Random Effect Tobit Model by Type of the Organizations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Type  Charity Charity Charity Government Government Government 
Experiment variables yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Perceptions  yes yes  yes yes 
Demographics     yes     yes 
Education -3.479*** -3.487*** -3.549*** -0.796 -0.675 -0.690 
 (0.639) (0.685) (0.686) (0.669) (0.706) (0.705) 
P&W -2.692*** -2.475*** -2.472*** -1.884*** -1.480* -1.465* 
 (0.735) (0.796) (0.795) (0.731) (0.816) (0.816) 
Disaster relief -0.227 -0.468 -0.448 -2.600*** -2.599*** -2.602*** 
 (0.572) (0.605) (0.604) (0.557) (0.583) (0.583) 
Texas -2.005*** -2.005*** -2.011*** -0.278 -0.491 -0.490 
 (0.435) (0.447) (0.447) (0.427) (0.438) (0.438) 
Dallas -2.447*** -2.217*** -2.222*** -1.699*** -1.703*** -1.701*** 
 (0.438) (0.453) (0.453) (0.438) (0.453) (0.452) 
Cancer-Disaster 4.381** 4.314** 2.444 5.569** 6.017*** 4.731** 
 (2.091) (2.111) (2.047) (2.326) (2.246) (2.247) 
Cancer-Education 0.205 0.0110 -1.598 -1.497 -1.285 -2.401 
 (2.097) (2.116) (2.053) (2.381) (2.284) (2.291) 
P&W-Disaster -1.881 -2.031 -3.224 1.150 1.496 0.706 
 (2.231) (2.252) (2.155) (2.480) (2.387) (2.358) 
important cause  0.637* 0.647*  0.797** 0.808** 
  (0.335) (0.334)  (0.355) (0.355) 
good organization  0.201 0.199  0.920*** 0.907*** 
  (0.409) (0.406)  (0.321) (0.321) 
responsibility  0.455 0.402  -0.0726 -0.0680 
  (0.295) (0.293)  (0.242) (0.242) 
female   5.234***   3.827** 
   (1.561)   (1.738) 
non_Caucasian   -1.305   -1.077 
   (1.579)   (1.760) 
age   0.0674   -0.157 
   (0.219)   (0.248) 
Constant 5.942*** 1.827 -0.371 2.447 -0.656 1.734 
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 (1.551) (2.226) (4.922) (1.727) (2.459) (5.572) 
L.L.F. -1186 -1119 -1114 -1060 -1010 -1008 
Observations 558 526 526 558 536 536 
Number of persons 93 92 92 93 92 92 
Dependent variable: unconditional giving. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
*     - significant at the 10% level  
**   - significant at the 5% level 
*** - significant at the 1% level  
 
 
Table 7: Random Effect Probit Model on the Likelihood of Giving (All causes pooled) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Charity 0.479*** 0.381*** 0.333**  
 (0.114) (0.146) (0.145)  
Education  -0.590*** -0.484** -0.535** -0.088 
 (0.200) (0.209) (0.215) (0.272) 
P&W -0.707*** -0.734*** -0.690*** -0.344 
 (0.232) (0.253) (0.254) (0.308) 
Disaster relief -0.354 -0.583** -0.588** -0.479 
 (0.228) (0.250) (0.254) (0.299) 
Texas -0.314** -0.426*** -0.456*** -0.430*** 
 (0.140) (0.150) (0.153) (0.151) 
Dallas -0.681*** -0.726*** -0.766*** -0.752*** 
 (0.142) (0.151) (0.155) (0.154) 
Cancer-Disaster 2.859*** 1.793*** 1.916*** 1.943*** 
 (0.359) (0.338) (0.307) (0.572) 
Cancer-Education -0.329 -0.069 -0.618** -0.145 
 (0.273) (0.244) (0.270) (0.433) 
P&W-Disaster 0.030 -0.439 -0.207 -0.153 
 (0.235) (0.297) (0.248) (0.442) 
charity*cancer    0.871** 
    (0.362) 
charity*education    -0.017 
    (0.121) 
charity*P&W    0.226 
    (0.312) 
charity*disaster    0.675* 
    (0.355) 
important cause  0.127 0.213** 0.221** 
  (0.094) (0.088) (0.103) 
good organization  0.539*** 0.574*** 0.508*** 
  (0.086) (0.086) (0.105) 
responsibility  0.053 -0.007 -0.015 
  (0.069) (0.066) (0.075) 
female   0.924*** 0.586** 
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   (0.207) (0.265) 
non-Caucasian   -0.650***  
   (0.169)  
age   0.031  
   (0.019)  
Constant 0.228 0.269 -0.370 -0.375 
 (0.251) (0.564) (0.639) (0.614) 
Observations 1116 1062 1062 1062 
L.L.F. -426.34 -384.18 -379.61 -375.41 
Observations 1116 1062 1062 1062 
Number of persons 93 92 92 92 
Dependent variable: probability of giving a positive gift. 
Coefficient estimates are reported. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
*     - significant at the 10% level  
**   - significant at the 5% level 
*** - significant at the 1% level  
 
 
Table 8: OLS Conditional on Giving (All causes pooled) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Charity  0.718*** 0.767*** 0.766***  
 (0.223) (0.268) (0.268)  
Education -1.091*** -1.242*** -1.257*** -0.980* 
 (0.404) (0.415) (0.415) (0.537) 
P&W -0.939** -0.666 -0.669 -0.170 
 (0.456) (0.482) (0.481) (0.595) 
Disaster relief -0.871*** -0.900*** -0.898*** -1.412*** 
 (0.333) (0.347) (0.347) (0.467) 
Texas -0.779*** -0.776*** -0.780*** -0.789*** 
 (0.260) (0.263) (0.263) (0.262) 
Dallas -1.037*** -0.874*** -0.883*** -0.883*** 
 (0.270) (0.274) (0.274) (0.273) 
Cancer-Disaster 1.925 1.641 1.026 1.025 
 (1.305) (1.324) (1.359) (1.370) 
Cancer-Education 0.250 -0.200 -0.618 -0.839 
 (1.351) (1.368) (1.421) (1.422) 
P&W-Disaster 0.0736 -0.474 -0.752 -1.051 
 (1.482) (1.503) (1.532) (1.531) 
charity*cancer    0.553 
    (0.631) 
charity*education    0.109 
    (0.255) 
charity*P&W    -0.335 
    (0.683) 
charity*disaster    1.555** 
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    (0.637) 
important cause  0.618*** 0.621*** 0.606*** 
  (0.217) (0.217) (0.216) 
good organization  0.517*** 0.513*** 0.453** 
  (0.193) (0.193) (0.194) 
responsibility  0.306** 0.304** 0.276** 
  (0.132) (0.132) (0.134) 
female   2.141** 1.754* 
   (1.048) (1.018) 
non-Caucasian   -1.569  
   (1.052)  
age   0.060  
   (0.148)  
Constant 7.259*** 3.752*** 2.332 3.418** 
 (1.007) (1.439) (3.307) (1.469) 
Observations 711 677 677 677 
R2 0.042 0.081 0.126 0.117 
Number of persons 80 79 79 79 
Dependent variable: gifts conditional giving. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
*     - significant at the 10% level  
**   - significant at the 5% level 
*** - significant at the 1% level  
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